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ScienceDirectHere, we briefly review the evolution of research on human
decision-making over the past few decades. We discern a
trend whereby biology moves from subserving economics
(neuroeconomics), to providing the data that advance our
knowledge of the nature of human decision-making (decision
neuroscience). Examples illustrate that the integration of
behavioural and biological models is fruitful especially for
understanding heterogeneity of choice in humans.
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Economic theories of human choice
For a large part of the 20th century, research on human
choice was dominated by economic theories, particularly
rational choice and revealed preferences theory. This ap-
proach starts from a limited set of properties that are
imposed on choices (rationality axioms). It then deter-
mines to what extent choices can be summarised (repre-
sented) by maximisation of some latent mathematical
function, typically referred to as utility or value
function. The form of the value function depends on
the nature of the axioms [1]. The value function and
its maximisation merely constitute a compact way to
summarise choices. In binary (pairwise) choice, for in-§ The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the finance d
Melbourne and from the finance department of the David Eccles School of B
shaped by numerous discussions with colleagues in economics, psycholo
particularly helpful. The views expressed here, however, are the authors’ o
www.sciencedirect.com stance, the economist does not need a look-up table: to
determine whether one option would be chosen over the
alternative, the economist merely picks the option with
the maximum value.
In economic theory, the value function does not neces-
sarily reflect subjective preferences, or the agent’s
‘needs’ or ‘wants.’ Preferences are formulated in a way
that is independent of the type of agent (human, market,
firm) whose choices the preferences describe. Thus,
the economist’s definition of the term ‘preferences’ is
fundamentally different from the psychologist’s. To
economists, preferences are merely a description of
choices, and preferences and choices are observationally
equivalent.
Soon after the emergence of the first instances of axiom-
atic choice theories, it became apparent that they could
not capture many key regularities of human choice. The
two most famous examples are the Allais [2] and Ellsberg
[3] paradoxes. In subsequent years, new value functions
were proposed that improved the fit with the empirical
data [4,5]. This development culminated in Prospect
Theory [6], which summarised salient characteristics of
actual human choice under uncertainty in terms of
maximisation of a utility index that featured a reference
point, a kink, probability weighting, and differential
curvature in the gain and loss domains. Some of these
features accommodated cognitive biases. Loss aversion,
for instance, is not merely a tendency to avoid risk
(which rational agents are allowed to do). Instead, it is
a cognitive bias that makes an agent choose differently
depending on whether a prospect is presented as losses
or as gains [7].
Prospect Theory models capture human cognitive biases
within a framework of utility maximisation. Thus, its
approach is consistent with the approaches of earlier
economic theories. The success of Prospect Theory
was sealed when an axiomatic version of the theory
emerged [8]. At the time, alternative (complementary
or substitutable) theories were proposed such as Herbert
Simon’s ‘satisficing’ [9] or Gerd Gigerenzer’s ‘heuristics
toolbox’ [10]. However, those theories cannot readily beepartment of the faculty of business and economics at the University of
usiness at the University of Utah. The contents of this article have been
gy and neuroscience. Comments from two anonymous referees were
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choice theory. Some have argued that Simon’s theory
could be translated into a value maximisation framework,
by adding constraints to cognition [11]. Unfortunately,
constrained optimisation often presupposes cognitive ca-
pabilities that contradict the bounded rationality that
underlies satisficing behaviour. Indeed, constrained opti-
misation problems may be very ‘hard’ [12]. Still, this is not
a concern for traditional economics, where the agent
would choose merely ‘as if’ implementing constrained
optimisation.
The strength of the axiomatic approach cannot be over-
estimated. It provides a disciplined way of modelling
choice as utility maximisation. It avoids the pitfalls of
other approaches that merely fit value functions to data.
Indeed, a value function may fit data well but may be such
that it violates rationality constraints that may be far less
controversial than the observed cognitive biases that the
value function was meant to capture in the first place.
Such was the case with the original version of Prospect
Theory [6], where the probability weighting function was
at odds with the sure-thing principle — outcomes that
would occur under any alternative prospect ended up
influencing choice. (The subsequent, axiomatic version
of Prospect Theory corrected this [13].)
The axiomatic approach and behavioural economics alike
start and finish with choice data. The value or utility
function that is maximised is just another way to describe
choices. The maximisation process (which, as already
mentioned, could be rather complex) is not to be taken
literally: the agent chooses ‘as if’ maximising utility.
Importantly, the axiomatic approach does not provide a
mechanistic account of how choice is implemented but
only describes the properties of choices. Equally impor-
tantly, both approaches assume that preferences are ex-
ogenous, which unfortunately precludes an important
type of intervention. ‘Bad’ choices (compulsive gambling,
insufficient retirement savings, eating disorders, drug
addiction, etc.) cannot be changed through a change of
preferences, but only through a change of the available
options or re-framing of the options [14], or through
education [15].
From understanding choice to understanding
neural circuitry: the advent of
neuroeconomics
With the emergence of non-invasive human brain imag-
ing techniques such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), it was only a matter of time before
economists and neuroscientists set out to determine if
there was any biological foundation of economic theories
of choice. Key aims were to determine how choices were
implemented biologically, which neural circuitry was
involved, and what algorithms were employed. A new
field emerged, referred to as neuroeconomics, focusing onCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2015, 5:37–42 the description of algorithms underlying observed
choice and their biophysical implementation. Human
decision-making would thereby become understand-
able at a lower level of description than the traditional,
abstract, axiomatic approach had done. It corrected a
situation which actually was the opposite of that in
vision research, where the biophysical took precedence
over the abstract [16].
Very quickly, this research program led to some fascinat-
ing results, including the discovery of, and subsequently,
ability to manipulate, the very value (utility) signals that
constitute the core of the axiomatic theory [17–21][17–
19,20,21]. More recently, it has provided more detail into
how value maximisation is implemented at a neural level,
borrowing ideas from drift-diffusion models in psycho-
physics [22] and detailed neural networks with mutual
inhibition [23], among others. This line of research also
led to the discovery that some basic axioms of choice
theory such as Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives
(IIA) are violated due to fundamental properties of the
central nervous system, namely, divisive normalisation
[24]. Violations occur when the availability of a third,
clearly inferior option, makes people choose the lower-
valued option in a pair more frequently than in the
absence of this third option. Under divisive normalisation,
inputs (e.g., sources of light, auditory signals, values of
available options) are re-scaled to fit a preset range.
Biophysically, divisive normalisation happens because
neuronal firing is affected by activation of nearby neurons.
The discovery was particularly exciting, because divisive
normalisation may predict behavioural features that econ-
omists had not detected yet. One small step in that
direction is the prediction that independent alternatives
may actually have the reverse effect on choice when the
values of options are relatively close. The example is also
important because it shows how biological data, hitherto
outside the field of view of economists, can help to make
sense of choice anomalies.
To date, neuroeconomic data have mainly been used to
better distinguish between competing valuation models
when choice data alone were not sufficient (given typical
sample sizes). Neuroeconomics has shown, for example,
that valuation based on Bayesian principles better
explains neural activation and choices in a reversal learn-
ing task [25]. Similarly, neurobiology demonstrated that
in certain settings, choice under uncertainty seems to be
based on mean-variance analysis rather than more tradi-
tional expected utility theory [26]. Mean-variance analy-
sis is popular in financial economics, yet unlike expected
utility theory, can cause violations of simple rationality
principles [27].
Despite all the successes of the neuroeconomic research
program, economists may argue that it is of little rele-
vance to economic theory, because of the perception thatwww.sciencedirect.com
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Propensity to choose one gamble against another as a function of
difference in value. Value is prospect theory expected utility as
estimated from all other choices. Diamonds are MAOA-L carriers; dots
are MAOA-H carriers. Estimated differences in values are no different
across genotypes (observations across genotypes are equally distant
on horizontal axis), yet choice propensities are very different
(observations on vertical axis are not equidistant). Solid black line
extending to black dashed line is best fit (softmax) for MAOA-H
carriers; best fit for MAOA-L carriers (solid black line extending to grey
dotted line) has a kink at zero (softmax with kink). Consequently,
prospect theory cannot capture observed differences in choice
propensities (phenotypes) for MAOA-H against MAOA-L carriers.
Overall, MAOA-H carriers take less risk, yet prospect theory does not
predict so. Parameter estimates (loss aversion, risk attitudes in gain
and loss domain, probability weighting) were statistically
indistinguishable (P = 0.05) across genotypes. Reproduced from [36].the levels at which one can understand human decision
making are relatively independent, an opinion also voiced
in vision research [16]. While it may be interesting to
know which neural algorithms implement observed
choice, and what biophysical constraints cause violations
of the axioms of choice theory, such knowledge is deemed
irrelevant for the future development of choice theory
[28,29].
Curiously, economists do appeal to biological principles
in other domains, in order to put discipline on the
parameters of their choice models. An important example
is the use of principles of evolutionary fitness to answers
questions such as: What are acceptable risk aversion
parameters? Will preferences feature inter-generational
substitution? [30,31]. Such approaches referring to the
theory of evolution to restrict preferences is not based on
observation, however (there are no data in the cited
work!). It is merely a device to restrict the parameter
space when axioms of choice are too weak to constrain the
theory sufficiently.
What if we started from biology? The
emergence of decision neuroscience
So far, biology has only played a supporting role in the
quest for a better understanding of human behaviour,
helping to differentiate between existing valuation mod-
els, or elucidating the biophysical mechanics and imple-
mentation algorithms behind human economic decision
making. However, in recent years evidence has emerged
that there is significant biological variation that does not
map into parametric variation of even the best economic
models. These findings are part of a new field, decision
neuroscience, focused on decision-making, but where biol-
ogy no longer subserves economics and instead takes a
central role [32].
Below, we give some examples of biological diversity that
maps into variation in behaviour that is reflected in the
error term of the most popular economic model that ties
valuation to choice, namely, logit, or in the language of
neuroeconomics, softmax. For economists, the error term
of the softmax model captures ‘unobserved heterogene-
ity’ [33]. However, it appears that this ‘error’ actually
contains useful information, because biological markers
explain it. Hence, it ought to be modelled explicitly.
One important area of research investigates the relation
between neurotransmitters and behaviour. Administra-
tion of Levadopa (L-dopa), a drug designed to increase
levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine in the brain, has
unintended effects on economic choice (unintended in
the sense that it does not explain conjectured effects on
parameters of existing choice models). In one study, L-
dopa appeared to speed up learning in a two-armed
reward bandit problem where subjects had to discover
the option that was most rewarding on averagewww.sciencedirect.com [34]. Closer inspection, however, suggests that partici-
pants who received L-dopa were less erratic in their
choices, which effectively meant that they were ‘better
optimisers.’ Increases in estimated learning speed could
merely be the consequence of better fit of the economic
model. Thus, administration of L-dopa changed the prop-
erties of the error term of the softmax model that linked
valuation with choice. More recently, it has been shown
that, even absent learning, L-dopa intervention has no
effect on Prospect Theory parameters, but instead shifts
the error term of the softmax function [35]. The
researchers who discovered the effect offered a quintes-
sentially biological explanation, namely, Pavlovian ap-
proach behaviour [51]. This dimension of behaviour
(phenotype) has yet to be captured by economic theories.
Other research has shown that while genetic variation
explains differences in risk taking across humans, this
genetic variation does not cause shifts in the parameters
in Prospect Theory that are meant to capture risk atti-
tudes [36]. Genetic variation actually correlated with a
tendency towards more or less optimising (relative to the
predictions of Prospect Theory), but only when availableCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2015, 5:37–42
40 Neuroeconomicsgambles were more valuable than the risk-free alterna-
tive. There, too, the error term of the softmax model
shifted (Figure 1).
This example is rather limited, because it is rare that a
single gene predicts behaviour. There is more promise in
polygenic or entire gene pathway analysis [37,38]. But the
example demonstrates how prior research had been
wrong to focus only on phenotypes that traditional eco-
nomic analysis recognised. In this case, the phenotype
concerned risk attitudes, and humans who were willing to
accept risky gambles were categorised as ‘more risk
tolerant.’ The genes correlating with this tendency to
accept risky gambles, it was concluded, were the ones
controlling risk aversion [39]. But the conclusion was
wrong: those who accepted risky gambles more frequent-
ly were not more risk tolerant; they were actually merely
‘better optimisers.’ Quality of optimisation is a phenotype
that is not captured by traditional economic analysis, but
evidently very much present in human decision-making,
and apparently has a simple genetic basis. (The gene,
MAOA, regulates catabolism of, among others, dopamine;Figure 2
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parameters of traditional economic models. Instead, the intervention change
that existing (neuro-)economic models are missing important dimensions of
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2015, 5:37–42 hence, the genetic effect on optimisation quality is not
unlike that of administrating L-Dopa [34].)
The examples point to a potential weakness of neuroe-
conomics: it often presupposes existing economic theo-
ries when analysing biological data, which has sometimes
led to the mis-interpretation of the latter. A particularly
pertinent example is related to the role of emotions in
economic decision making. It has been known for some
time that emotions and rational decision-making are not
orthogonal. A key study [40] contrasted choices under
uncertainty among patients with prefrontal and amygdala
brain lesions, and discovered that emotional engagement
during risk taking is crucial for ‘reasoned’ decision mak-
ing. In contrast, economists had been modeling emotions
as interfering with rational decision making, in the form of
dual-self theory (e.g., [41]). Accounts of neuroeconomics,
too, often tend to emphasise a sharp delineation between,
among others, ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ processes
[42]. Such dual-self theories unfortunately have biased
interpretation of neural signals on a number of occasions
[43].Biology
Neuro-
economics
Δu
fre
q
Behaviour (choices)
Genes
u(c)
= 1 – e–γc
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences
nces revealed by choices are linked to brain and genes through the
nces to properties of the brain and the genome through economic
data and model parameters, such as risk aversion, are then correlated
his approach has severe limitations. A study using an intervention at
ange showed that the change in behaviour was not captured by
d the properties of the error term of economic models, suggesting
 human behaviour.
www.sciencedirect.com
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Traditional economic approaches (including behavioural
economics) as well as neuroeconomics have taken a
choice-centred approach. If biology is appealed to at
all, it is used as ‘supporting’ or ‘converging’ evidence
for extant theories of choice. In contrast, we advocate an
approach where biology takes a more central role. In such
an approach, biological variation would be used to iden-
tify potential behavioural variation that would be missed
(read: absorbed by the error term) if one were to follow
economic theory alone. Behavioural scientists are to en-
gage in a genuine dialogue with biologists, because biol-
ogists observe phenomena relevant to choice that
traditional models do not capture, and they have research
methods to manipulate these phenomena (e.g., pharma-
cological interventions) that behavioural scientists do not
have. The contribution of biology to research on choice
should not be limited to providing a mechanistic account
of human decision-making. Its role should be extended to
providing some of the foundations of theories of human
behaviour (Figure 2).
In our discussion of the merits of decision neuroscience
for understanding human decision-making, we have
focused on choice heterogeneity, both between and
within individuals. One cannot overestimate the practi-
cal relevance of an improved understanding of hetero-
geneity, not only for economic policy and welfare, but
also clinical psychology, psychiatry and public health.
An illustrative example is dopamine-replacement ther-
apy in Parkinson’s disease. While effective in alleviat-
ing many symptoms of the disease, about one fifth of
patients receiving such therapy develop impulse-control
disorders, the most frequent one being pathological
gambling [one quarter of affected cases; [44]]. At pres-
ent, the effect is not fully understood but it is conceiv-
able that the pathway is similar to the one described in
Section ‘What if we started from biology? The emer-
gence of decision neuroscience’ and thus outside of
current economic theory. Illumination of the pathway
will help develop improved medication for Parkinson’s
disease, and in the process enhance our understanding
of the factors influencing risk-taking.
A final remark concerns the scope of this novel research
approach. It should be obvious that it only applies to
individual human decision making. The discipline of
Economics is more ambitious than that, however. Econ-
omists want to describe (and predict) economic decision
making in general, whether the decision is made by an
individual, or by an institution such as a financial market
or a government. Although noble in its goal, this research
program may be overly ambitious. We know now that the
behaviours of individuals and institutions, such as mar-
kets, have very different properties. Traditional theories
of choice evidently explain market (i.e., aggregate) phe-
nomena better than the choices of the individuals whowww.sciencedirect.com populate the market [45,46]. Only recently have we
begun to understand why [47]. Importantly, this does
not mean that decision neuroscience cannot help explain
phenomena at an aggregate level, such as in markets.
Indeed, recent research in neuroscience has interesting
things to say about how individuals behave in the face of,
for example, institution-generated uncertainty, and why
[48–50].
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